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Abstract
This paper examines the developments that lead up to the government bailout of General
Motors and Chrysler in 2009. The purpose is to examine and discover the historical,
industrial and financial factors that drove American cars into the ground. In today’s
society, the perception is that foreign automobiles are superior to domestic vehicles. This
comes half a century after culture in the United States circulated around the American
automobile. The American big business techniques built a manufacturing empire,
differentiated the US from the foreigners and then weakened the long-term development of
the automotive industry. Financialization became a support in an attempt to support a
crumbling system. Each individual strategy was successful in the short term but came
together to negatively influence the long-term industry. These elements conclude a selfdestructive fate of the US automobile manufacturers. The bailout was not the fault of the
nation but rather the responsibility of the Big Three.
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Introduction
During the mid twentieth century, Ford, General Motors and Chrysler were booming
with growing business and a customer base that craved American automobiles. Today, the
automotive industry is still one of the largest and most powerful sectors in the United
States. However, since the time of auto boom, the American automakers have been
downsizing in relation to the whole industry and losing interest from the population.
Foreign manufacturers have been increasingly taking market share away from the US
brands to the extent that the Americans are fighting to survive. In 2007 the Big Three US
carmakers approached the United States government pleading for a stimulus package that
would save them from bankruptcy. How, then, did a dominant American industry fall from
glory into shambles over half a century?
The decline of the US automotive industry began before any of the three companies
showed any signs of decay. The problem was not with the carmakers specifically, but with
big business in America as a whole. Large-scale production is a characteristic of US
manufacturing since the beginning. Definitive characteristics come along with large scale
manufacturing that separate it from foreign industries. While it is perceived that big
business is synonymous with success, we will examine below why it can be self-destructive
to an industry. The US automakers did not understand that there exists too much of one
thing and it requires further exploration in order to expand. The American automakers
believed that a single working strategy could be expanded continuously. This defined the
policy of American auto growth. The Big Three began using this to manufacture vehicles
and later translated the same strategy into their financialization.
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The perception is that the decline of the US automakers is due to the state of the
economy during the 2007 financial crisis. However I believe a government bailout package
would have been necessary even if the economy had not went into a recession. Statistics
are evidence that a decline had begun far before the national economic decay. The
practices of Ford, General Motors and Chrysler display deteriorating stability and a lack of
long term growth that originated from old habits. The Big Three had built an empire upon
a deteriorating foundation that was bound to crumble. As the companies financialized
further between 1990 and 2007, the weaknesses in the industrial groundwork were
magnified. A weak manufacturing industry held up by risky financial practices concludes in
failure. The financial crisis of 2007 was the stimulus that caused Ford, General Motors and
Chrysler to finally crumble but was not the driving force that brought the firms to that
point.
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1. Automotive Industrialization

European Manufacturing
During the 2007 economic recession, American banks and businesses, including
Ford, General Motors and Chrysler, were drowning in a financial catastrophe. As thousands
of American workers were losing jobs, Germany was enduring positive development.
German employment rose through the late 2000s, an overall period of poor economic state.
The United States was suffering from unprecedented unemployment rates during the same
period. The reasons for this deviation are rooted in the background and development of
each economy, as well as the manufacturing industry with each.
A powerful economy relies on an equally powerful manufacturing sector in order to
create goods. The more products a nation is able to produce and successfully sell, the more
stimulation will be generated within the economy. In order to effectively produce a large
number of goods, a country must have a very large customer base and therefore export to
foreign countries. This opens up a much wider population of possible customers than the
limited number within each nation. To do so means the manufacturing industries must be
capable of producing items that are consumed within as well as outside the country. As the
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United States hit the economic recession in the late 2000s president Barack Obama
understood raising exports would help boost the economy. However, by 2011 the US was
far behind in their export industries and “Germany had quietly become the world’s secondlargest exporter (after China)” (Rattner 7). How, therefore, did the much smaller
European nation grow to surpass the economic giant in such an important financial facet?
Germany’s success is based around their private as well as their public sectors. The
foundation to Germany’s manufacturing and success is the Mittelstand. The Mittelstand is
the vast number of small to medium sized private firms that make up the majority of the
German manufacturing industry. These smaller companies focus on “producing
sophisticated goods that emerging markets cannot easily replicate” (Rattner 8). What this
means is that each small firm concentrates all of its resources on developing only a few
goods. In doing so, all of these parts are given great attention and a large importance is
placed upon each one. In addition, these companies aim toward long-term growth instead
of short-term profits.
This is a disaggregated system of manufacturing. Each good coming out of
individual upstream firms is moved to downstream companies to create the final good for
consumers. According to Rattner, the German saying is “we make the thing that goes inside
the thing that goes inside the thing” (8). This allows each individual product and part to be
more superior as it gets more attention. This should not be confused with horizontal
integration in which multiple small firms manufacturing the same or similar products
merge to form a larger firm. Instead, the German system utilizes many small, separated
firms manufacturing different goods that combine downstream to form a final good. The
contrary strategy is for a single company to manufacture most or all parts that are
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necessary in producing the final product. This is known as vertical integration, which is
characteristic of the United States automotive manufacturers. The American system of big
business manufactures many different parts that go into the final product by one company
within the same factory.
On top of private sector success, Germany’s public sector aims to help the economy.
One such example is the Agenda 2010. Passed in 2005 by the then chancellor, this
reorganized the German welfare system. The policy aimed at “pairing unemployment
benefits to encourage work, relaxing stultifying regulatory practices, and forging a grand
bargain with labor unions whereby the unions agreed to hold down wages and the
government assured job security for workers” (Rattner 8). According to the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, this agenda saved about half a million jobs by
2009. Policies such as this aid in assisting individuals and businesses as well as boosting
economic growth.
Besides the Mittelstand and government policy, Germany’s economy is largely based
around its automotive superpowers. BMW, Daimler and Volkswagen reside in and make
up nearly 20 percent of Germany’s GDP, according to Rattner. These three firms are the
parent companies to Mini, Rolls Royce, Mercedes-Benz, Smart, Maybach, AMG, Audi,
Bentley, Lamborghini, Bugatti and Porsche. While the three large companies contain many
subsidiaries, all of the brands are making expensive vehicles. The high sales figures from
the large German automakers contribute to a high level of product innovation. The
Germans are known for over engineering their products and striving for perfection. Figure
1.1 below demonstrates the level of investment put into the continued manufacturing of
German cars and trucks. The figure displays relative levels of research and development in
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German industries. In 2014 alone, over 17.6 billion euros were spent on German
automobile research and development (Industry Overview: The Automotive Industry in
Germany, Germany Trade & Invest). This exemplifies the innovation within BMW, Daimler
and Volkswagen.

Figure 1.1: Research and development expenditure in Germany 2015. Graph from Germany Trade & Invest

Germany’s automotive industry has exceeded in producing high-end cars. The
benefit of producing these types of vehicles is they flourish in affluent, booming markets
like China. China “alone accounts for 25 percent of BMW’s global profits” (Rattner 8). The
story is the same with the other German auto manufacturers who also have high sales
levels in foreign countries. This means that the German manufacturing industry, along with
the entire economy, is largely based on exports. As shown above, this is largely beneficial to
a nation’s economy. While the United States was attempting to raise their export numbers,
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Germany had already dominated the sector by creating a product foreign countries want.
This has proven to be a very successful strategy demonstrated by the current strength of
the German economy.

Japanese Development
After World War 2, Japan set its sights on new techniques for industrialization.
“Whereas German products had long been at the top of the quality spectrum, Japanese
products were at the bottom” (Best 137). Rather than attempting to follow the American
manufacturing system, the Japanese decided to implement four new strategies. These new
techniques would propel Japan to expand extremely rapidly between 1946 and 1976. The
strategies that would transform Japan were low wage, scale economies, focus and overhead
economies and flexible production. These methods were unique and created an entirely
new form of industrial manufacturing.
Low wages were the initial strategy implemented by Japan to optimize the nation’s
labor resource. During the post-war period, this was one of few Japanese available assets.
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The country managed to optimize industries that were labor intensive in order to maximize
the available resource. The Japanese paid workers very little as the large supply of laborers
allowed little bargaining power for the people. This technique would reduce the
manufacturing industry’s cost tremendously during the mid twentieth century.
Japan’s labor cost was severely lower than that of the United States and Europe in
the manufacturing industries. This allowed the Japanese to produce goods that were also
at a substantial discount. The low production costs, in relation to competitors, meant
Japanese profit margins could exceed the foreign companies while selling less expensive
goods. Low priced goods exposed Japan to available exchange in other parts of the world.
As the United States could not compete with Japanese prices, demand for these foreign
goods rose. This alone, however, was not enough to fully transform the Japanese industrial
sector.
According to Best, Japan’s next industrial strategy was to use scale economies.
Economies of scale use high volume production processes to reduce the marginal cost and
increase profit margins. The process required greater one time costs in the early stages but
would reduce the production cost by allowing firms to produce large quantities at low
prices.
The Japanese investments, like Carnegie’s, would not have been justified on a
discounted cash flow rate of return basis. They were long-term strategic
investments to penetrate markets… after many years they began to pay for
themselves because cost economies were sufficient to establish market dominance.
(Best 141).
While the Japanese had to take a risk in initially investing greatly into the production
process, it paid off for the country by reducing manufacturing costs in the long run.

9
Without doing so, the Japanese may not have been able to penetrate the global market or
account for nearly the same level of exports.
Once scale economies were in place, the Japanese could begin working on efficient
production. Using focus and overhead economies, the Japanese concentrated much more
meticulously on the production line. Rather than having multiple production lines
manufacturing several different products, the Japanese created a single line that produced
high volumes of one product. This strategy reduced the overhead cost and complications
that came with producing multiple items. Due to their higher overhead costs, the American
firms were not able to compete with the low price point of Japanese products. The
Japanese knew they could later expand efficient production but the single production line
set the foundation for market development and global competition.
Flexible production became Japan’s next step into competing with global giants in
America and Europe. While focus and overhead economies allowed Japan to initially out
price the competition, they had to expand in order to compete with America’s multiple
production lines. “The first three strategies were cost dominated, but the emphasis shifted
from conserving costs of direct to indirect labor… the fourth is distinguished by an
endogenous capacity of Japanese firms to improve continuously” (Best 140). Japanese
ingenuity and development of their existing processes allowed them to expand without
increasing costs. Efficiency was key to expanding in Japan and the Japanese industries did
not rush into the process. This development is what built Japan into the manufacturing
power that it is today.
Michael Best’s description of Japanese business in relation to the Americans gives no
doubt that the foreign firms were manufacturing things better. Unlike American big
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business techniques, Japanese and European firms sought to drive productivity and
structure. Best describes the Japanese rising industry, or New Competition, as, “not about
maximizing profits for a given material, product, process, and organizational method, but
about seeking a competitive advantage by continuously upgrading product, process and
organization” (144). This new foreign system of manufacturing is consistently upgrading
and bettering its manufacturing techniques. This began a new line of thinking among
automobile manufacturers. Rather than competing exclusively for profit the Japanese
aimed towards competitive advantage. This means that the companies tried outperforming
those in America using efficient techniques.
In using the efficient techniques the Japanese had developed over its years of
industrializing, the speed developed was faster than ever expected. By investing resources
to develop the best techniques in the beginning, the Japanese set themselves up for success
later on. Best writes,
In a little over two decades, the Japanese steel industry did what Carnegie had done
a hundred years before: international production leadership was established by
investing heavily in the latest steel-making technologies which enable it to drive
costs below the competition. (141).
Unlike the Americans, however, the Japanese did not see a successful technique as one to
stand by but rather one to continually improve and develop on.
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United States Big Business
The American business has always been unique in the bigger picture of global
industry. Early industrialization and innovation have pushed the country to move rapidly
over time. The shared traits of these quickly expanding businesses all circle around largescale production models. In America, bigger is better and producing more leads to selling
and earning more. The Americans believe where there is room to improve, there is also
room to make more.
American industry sought to capitalize on the ability to produce large quantities at a
lower cost. Rather than focusing on the product they were producing, US firms were
concentrating on the quantity they could manufacture. This started an American trend of
mass production that created large volumes at lower prices.
Mass production relaxes the constraint of rising marginal costs which, in turn,
creates a strategic possibility not open to the firm in the perfect competition model:
the mass producer can react to a condition of excess supply by increasing supply.
The strategy would be to increase market share and compensate for lower margins
with higher volume (Best 74).
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This theory of manufacturing creates compromise, as quantity is the driving force. Other
factors such as cost and price were seen by American big businesses as flexible around
quantity.
In 1919, after near bankruptcy due to a lack of inventory, General Motors
reorganized the company structure. They adopted the system of “standard pricing” created
by Donaldson Brown. Brown stated “the object of management is not necessarily the
highest attainable rate of return on capital, but rather the highest return consistent with
attainable volume” (Best 66). This meant that GM would not adjust prices based on the
costs of the business cycle but would keep prices constant to dramatically even out profits.
This initiated General Motor’s process of mass production as they could reduce costs by
increasing production while keeping prices the same.
Ford desired to make a product that everyone could afford. Henry Ford’s “approach
to sector regulation was to establish Ford Motor Company as the lowest cost producer and
dominate the industry to such an extent that he could ignore competitors” (Best 78). This
competitive attitude is what drove the American companies to produce. In order to
increase consumer consumption, Ford raised the wages of his workers so they would
become customers. He was looking to mass produce at the largest scale possible.
The Americans became consumed by increasing output to compete on the price of
their vehicles. In Game Theory economics, this is known as the Bertrand economic model,
in which firms choose their price in the market competing with identical products as the
competitors. As said by Best, “General Motors did not plan for the New Competition” (80),
meaning the Americans were not concerned with the strategies of foreign firms. American
companies believed that by reducing the price of their vehicles in relation to foreign
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companies, their product would be more appealing. In cheapening their product, American
auto manufacturers believed they could entice buyers away from the more expensive
foreigners. While this worked for some time, American build quality began to negatively
affect the companies. The smaller firms in foreign countries like Japan and Germany
learned and practiced new production techniques and slowly established more
technological developments. They also began gaining market power to move successfully
into the industry.
The American focus turned into a strict desire for profits. The system of producing
more and charging less was the sole strategy in earning more money. The firms did not
look at this in the long run but exclusively in the short run; a short run price competition
against much smaller companies that were emerging. The Americans knew the small firms
could not produce the quantity of output at their price and sought to drive them out of the
market. Rather than continuing the innovation that built the country, the American
automakers halted their progression and exclusively used these older techniques. This was
a crucial error, as the Americans would have to then play catch up decades later.
The United States automotive industry has always been a powerful force within the
country. With up and down market fluctuations, rarely did it ever occur that the country’s
automobile companies would be in jeopardy of going out of business. In 1953 Charles
Wilson, the then president of General Motors, declared, “As General Motors goes so does
the nation”. Today, no American automobile manufacturer would dare to make such a
declaration. The American auto industry has been in a slow decline since its peak during
the mid twentieth century. Many have argued the reason for the decline but no one can
positively identify the element or elements behind it.
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Recounting what was stated above, American firms have had a fixation with large
industry. This obsession began early in American industrialization with the construction of
the railroad system and Andrew Carnegie’s steel business. According to Best,
Once the railroads were established. Big Business emerged rapidly in those
industries in which high throughput technologies could be deployed. Driving costs
down by administrative coordination created profits in the form of quasi-rents to
the early birds in a sector. Followers, however, had to struggle for a market share
against a firm already achieving throughput economies. (48-49).
This exemplifies the American system of business in terms of scalability. US industries will
attempt to expand as rapidly as possible in order to dominate the market. With new
industry, it becomes a race as to which firm can do this fastest with the goal to push all
other competitors out. American automobile manufacturers used this same technique
while competing with foreign carmakers. Pushing high quantities with large price
discounts was believed to exclude companies in Europe and Asia.
The Americans did not foresee the numerous downsides that would form as a result
of such industrial large-scale structure. “American Big Business suffers from rigid
command and control production organizations” (Best 7). Large corporate structure
comes with strict protocols that slow and limit internal change. Unlike smaller firms that
were forming internationally, American big business was slow to implement changes
where need be. This slowed the American progress as the market dynamic continued to
change. “American competitors who invested on the basis of rate of return for given
production methods found themselves, too late, with declining market shares and lossmaking operations. The lesson of Carnegie’s overwhelming of the British Steel industry
had been forgotten in America” (Best 141). The Big Three automakers were able to survive
with their lack of innovation until substantial changes occurred around the world.
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American Automotive Trend
In the early 1980s, Ford, Chrysler and General Motors all produced compact pickup
trucks and SUVs in response to high gas prices at the end of the 1970s. Pickup trucks had
already been around for decades and a few sport utility vehicles, such as the Willys Jeep,
were being produced as early as 1965. However, these cars maintained a presence in niche
markets and were not marketed toward the masses. As gas prices began decreasing
through the 1980s, the market opened up for the possibility of larger vehicles. The Jeep
Cherokee, Chevrolet Blazer and Ford Bronco II all debuted in 1983 and 1984 aimed at
better gas mileage compared to older large vehicles. These models began selling in much
greater numbers than anyone expected. About a year later, the full-sized pickup truck and
SUV market followed the same trend. A sudden popularity of SUVs was especially
unexpected and remarkable. Between 1982 and 1985 the sales of SUVs jumped from
132,000 to over 800,000 (McCarthy).
In addition to the lower oil prices, falling interest rates and reduced inflation opened
the door for light trucks and SUVs. The US auto companies benefited from the improved
economic condition and unpredicted change in consumer preference. Baby Boomers paved
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the way for SUVs in the mass market, as they were buying more of these vehicles than any
other group. This generation was the first to begin substituting light trucks for their cars.
“The median age of SUV buyers in 1987, for example, was thirty-five when the median age
of buyers for many domestic car lines was over fifty” (McCarthy 232-233). The tough, offroad capabilities of these new vehicles resonated with the younger audience.
While the trend began by the image of greater access to outdoor recreational
activities, only about 10 percent of SUVs in the 1980s were being used off-road. The
illusion of being used in the “wild outdoors” covered up the environmental problems the
vehicles had. According to psychologist Timothy D. Wilson, the indirect advertising of SUVs
motivated Americans in the 1980s and 90s, to consider themselves outdoorsy, adventurous
people (McCarthy). The association with the outdoors became a trend during this time,
especially with American men. Market researcher Thomas F. O’Grady stated, “even though
they are used mostly on the road, sports utilities fit people’s images of themselves. They
project a rugged, tough image that some people like.” (McCarthy 234-235). Americans also
saw this as an opportunity to eliminate station wagons in exchange for the new sport utility
vehicles. Having more space within the vehicle for children and pets no longer meant
sacrificing style.
The sport utility vehicle quickly became a fashion statement in American society.
The automotive trend had a major shift toward taller, boxier motor vehicles. This was a
large contrast from the long, low cars of the 1970s, such as the Cadillac Eldorado, Ford
Thunderbird and Chrysler Imperial. The SUV arrived as a long awaited change in
automotive styling after years of monotony. This resulted in huge demand for something
new and different. Consumers, manufacturers and media all embraced this desire with the
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SUV. General Motors, Ford and Chrysler all rejoiced the new trend and dominated the
market, as foreign competitors were not creating the same vehicles. Foreign companies
such the Japanese manufacturer, Suzuki, tried entering this new market by creating small,
low-budget sport utility vehicles like the Samurai. However, these smaller SUVs never
caught on in the United States as people were looking for larger vehicles.
During the 1980s, scientists had already begun doing research on the impact of the
automobile to the environment. Global warming was a validated theory among scientists
and the dangers of gasoline consumption were becoming apparent. However, neither this
nor the dangers of SUVs, such as rollovers, seemed to affect consumers. Sport utility
vehicle sales continued to grow as low gas prices signaled opportunity for larger and larger
vehicles for customers. People were looking for an alternative to the minivan that had a
‘cooler’ image. The Jeep Cherokee was one of the first to do this and the other American
manufacturers such responded with models such as the Ford Explorer in 1990. The
Explorer became the pinnacle of SUVs in the US, immediately becoming the best-selling
four-door SUV in its first year. Between 1975 and 1992, the percent of SUVs in America
nearly doubled from 19 percent to 37.4 percent of all passenger vehicle sales (McCarthy).
According to Tom McCarthy, by 1997 nearly half of new vehicles sold in the United States
were light trucks. The economic condition at the time allowed high asset turnover for the
American carmakers as SUV sales were booming. As we will discuss in a later chapter, this
paired with high profit margins from low costs and a lack of foreign competition made the
American automakers greedy.
During this time of huge growth in the sport utility vehicle, neither consumers nor
regulators were concerned with the emissions of these automobiles. The regulations on
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these vehicles were lightly regulated and some SUVs “emitted as much as five and a half
times more smog-causing pollutants per mile than cars” (McCarthy 240). SUVs were larger
and heavier than cars, consumed much more fuel and produced more carbon dioxide.
“Under EPCA, Congress permitted light trucks to meet less stringent fuel economy
standards than cars” (McCarthy 241). The American auto industry was balancing on the
current low oil prices and a lack of innovation. As we will discuss below, this dynamic was
supported by easy credit policies on the part of financial institutions. “Prior to the financial
crisis, General Motors and Chrysler concentrated on producing larger, less-fuel-efficient,
and more-costly-to-produce models than their competitors, and offered aggressive price
discounts to consumers” (Goolsbee and Krueger 14). It was these practices that drove the
companies to fall as the oil market changed.

Domestic Transplant Carmakers
The turn of the century marked the tipping point for the Big Three automakers. Oil
prices began to rise and Americans began trading in their large SUVs for small, fuel-efficient
foreign cars. Ford, General Motors and Chrysler began dramatically losing profits in the
mid 2000s. With their poor performance, one of the first measures was to begin laying off
workers. From 2003 to 2013, the employment from the US automakers fell by nearly 50%
ending in approximately 253,000 in 2013.
During the same period, foreign companies such as Toyota and Honda were
increasing production and employment within the United States. These companies from
Asia and Europe who are producing their product on US soil are know as domestic
transplant carmakers (DTCs). Domestic transplant companies have been steadily
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increasing production and nearly doubled employment to 163,000 by 2013 (Goolsbee and
Krueger). Goolsbee and Krueger state that the American employment differences between
US and domestic automakers show evidence that the problems within the Big Three
automakers were unique to them and not foreign manufacturers.
The problem with the domestic transplant companies is the difference in wage and
labor cost from the US firms. During the government restructuring, General Motors agreed
to reduce employment from 96,000 to 45,000 by 2012 in order to have similar labor costs
as the DTCs. “Estimates of the hourly compensation of the Big Three automakers put
hourly compensation almost 25 percent higher than in the transplants” (Goolsbee and
Krueger 6). Higher costs for the US companies were created by inflated wages and labor
unions. This was one more element that the Big Three were battling while trying to
compete with foreign manufacturers.

Government Bailout
Up to 2009, Ford, General Motors and Chrysler endured a continuous decline,
logging some of the “worst corporate performances in American history” (Goolsbee and
Krueger 4). In just a few years, US auto sales plummeted from a peak of more than 17
million vehicles per year to below 10 million in 2009. Sales were deeply affected by “the
widespread perception of perennial quality and reliability issues, lower resale values,
poorly received new models, and a lack of low-gas-mileage cars at times of rising fuel costs”
(Goolsbee and Krueger 5). The American car companies were in a bad spot and it was clear
bankruptcy was inevitable if things did not change.
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Austan D. Goolsbee and Alan B. Krueger were directly involved with the government
automotive bailout during 2008-2009. The decision to assist three major US businesses on
the brink of bankruptcy was disputed amongst many Americans during the time. To this
day many still argue that a failing business should have to pay the price for producing a
subpar product. However, the fait of the three automotive giants would not only affect the
workers who were employed by General Motors, Ford and Chrysler but also every other
individual living in the United States. Whether the government assisted the companies or
not, the American economy would be affected in a major way.
In the last quarter of 2008, the CEOs of all Big Three auto manufacturers requested a
“bridge loan” of 25 billion dollars from the United States government in order to remain
afloat. The three men blamed their companies’ downturn on the “Nation’s financial
meltdown.” Chrysler CEO Robert Nardelli claimed that a shortage of credit caused by the
recessionary economy was to blame for lack of auto sales. The company heads tried to fool
the public into believing the economy was at fault for the American auto performance.
However, as examined in the following chapter, the figures for Ford, General Motors and
Chrysler prove Robert Nardelli and the other CEOs very wrong.
As the Big Three auto executives begged the government for money, they were
criticized for internal company weakness. Skepticism spread over whether the auto
companies could ever recover due to the poor business that had plagued the industry.
Critics highlighted issues of “high cost, questionable quality, and the like as factors
contributing to the industry’s troubles during the financial crisis.” (Goolsbee and Krueger
5). While the CEOs claimed they had fixed these problems, Goolsbee and Krueger say that
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the problems had been building for years and the economic recession was certainly not the
sole reason behind their decline.
When the issue developed in front of the Obama administration, the main concern
was extreme job loss in the United States. The firms would lay off all workers if things
continued the way they were going. In 2009, the Congressional Oversight Panel said that a
collapse of General Motors and Chrysler would be “a potentially crippling blow to the
American economy that Treasury estimated would eliminate nearly 1.1 million jobs.”
(Goolsbee and Krueger 8). It was estimated at the time, that a liquidation of Chrysler on its
own would result in the loss of approximately 300,000 jobs (Goolsbee and Krueger). This
kind of result would produce a huge increase in US unemployment numbers as well as
great costs to the government such as health care, unemployment insurance and additional
programs that come with increased unemployment. The alternative option to providing a
rescue plan, therefore, could prove just as, if not more, costly to the nation.
As the government is naturally risk-averse, the answer predictably leans toward the
conservative choice. In order to avoid the risk of a massive boom in unemployment and hit
to the economy, the decision was made to assist the auto industry. Clearly it would be
devastating for three giant firms to fail at the same so some assistance was necessary. The
government now had to chose the level of assistance to provide, as the choice to help one,
two or all three of the companies was still pending.
Despite enduring significant losses, Ford chose not to take government support.
While the United States government lent General Motors and Chrysler more than $20
billion at the end of 2008 just to hold the companies over until a bailout decision was made,
Ford opted out. The company “had borrowed a significant amount of money in 2006 and
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begun restructuring before the financial crisis struck” (Goolsbee and Krueger 7). Because
Ford planned further ahead than GM and Chrysler they were able to withstand an economic
recession better. This is an indication that incompetence and a lack of planning may have
played factors in the degree of failure from the other two firms.
The money that was leant to GM and Chrysler at the end of 2008 was in order to
prevent bankruptcy in the short-term. Congress was still deciding upon the bailout but had
to adjourn for the holidays. As the two firms were at risk of failing in the time before a
decision was made in early 2009, the government chose to lend over $20 billion. This
money came out of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) using the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act. While $17.5 billion went toward the automakers, the
remainder of the loan was given to the two associated financial groups. Combined, General
Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) and Chrysler Financial received over $2.5 billion.
As shown below, these financial institutions played a huge role in the American automotive
industry during this time.
Internal debate over the final bailout eventually settled upon the topic of Chrysler.
A large number of people believed that the smallest of the Big Three would not survive,
even after government interference and support. In a meeting over the automotive
bailouts in March 2009, Goolsbee and Krueger both stated they did not believe Chrysler
would survive another five years. This was also the majority opinion among the Obama
administration’s economic and auto team.
Our analysis suggested that a failure of the much smaller Chrysler, however, would
probably not have systemic effects for the whole industry and that rescuing the
company would make it more difficult and more costly for taxpayers to rescue GM,
although we recognized that a failure of Chrysler would cause considerable
hardship to its workers and their families and communities (Goolsbee and Krueger
4).
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The Chrysler auto sales had plummeted in the short period between 2006 and 2009. In
addition, Goolsbee and Krueger state that industry research led them to believe that
current Chrysler customers would most likely turn to a different American car maker in the
event of Chrysler going out of business. One hope for the company was a reconstruction
through being acquired by another firm, as there was prospect in Fiat obtaining the
company. However, Chrysler had already merged twice before, once with Daimler-Benz in
1998 and later with Cerberus in 2007. Neither of these previous acquisitions had proved
successful so a third looked less hopeful.
While hope for Chrysler was slim, the company maintained several strong pillars
that could hold it up. Chrysler contained its other automotive branches: Jeep, Dodge, SRT
and Ram trucks. Some of these divisions were much more successful than the overall
company. It was even discussed whether Chrysler could survive by saving its minivan and
Jeep units. The decision was eventually made to save Chrysler, along with GM, in a
resolution that “was based more on political and social reality,” according to Rattner.
“President Obama heard the analysis on all sides of the issue. He concluded that the
economy should not risk the failure of both companies in 2009 and opted to rescue both
General Motors and Chrysler” (Goolsbee and Krueger 12).
President Obama rejected the initial restructuring proposal by Chrysler and General
Motors and demanded a more severe reorganization attempt. The government recruited a
team of private sector turnaround experts that would lead efforts to fix GM and Chrysler.
Debate finally settled and the US Treasury Department lent $51 billion to General Motors
and $12.5 billion to Chrysler. In addition to the two auto companies, the bailout and
restructuring would also apply to each firm’s affiliated financing company and auto parts
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supplier. GMAC received $17.2 billion as part of the rescue package totaling over $80
billion in government loans. The American auto industry was in the same condition as the
big banks that had tipped the financial crisis. The devastating state of the Big Three by
2009 alludes to a plethora of bad business practices and strategies that far exceeded the
condition of the national economic condition.
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2. Measuring the Fall of an Industry
The automotive bailout has been criticized harshly since the initiative began in
2007. Many people within and outside the United States do not agree with the decision to
aid the failing companies. This belief expresses that if your firm fails to profit in the
industry, then it deserves to go out of business like any smaller business. In the previous
chapter we discussed the American auto CEOs suggesting it was not their fault for their
poor performance and rather the fault of the economic condition. However, it is evident
that American production strategy was highly flawed in comparison with foreign
companies.
Why then, did the United States government feel the need to prevent American auto
companies from going into bankruptcy? This suggests the companies’ success has direct
and indirect effects. Ford, General Motors and Chrysler are three giants in America today.
Each one individually holds a great amount of power in the United States economy. The
impact of changes in extremely large companies is much deeper than that of most firms
that are medium to small in size. Large corporations like the Big Three automakers affect
large economic factors such as job creation, consumer spending and economic growth. An
upset in any or all of these items is harmful to the country as a whole. In the case of the
United States, if Ford, General Motors and/or Chrysler are upset or altered, the resultant
will ripple through the American economy.
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Fuel Economy
One explanation for the decline in US automobiles is the increase in oil prices.
Figure 2.1 displays the price of US regular gasoline between 1992 and 2014. Prior to 2000,
prices remained relatively stable at a little over one dollar per gallon. It was during this
time of the 1990s that American SUVs were booming. The Big Three seemed to have little
concern for producing vehicles with good fuel economy. This was the time that cars and
trucks became bigger and bigger as Americans embraced the low costs.
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Figure 2.1: US national regular gas prices in dollars per gallon

However, the figure shows that after 2000, there is an extreme upturn in oil prices.
Around this time Americans began replacing their big cars and SUVs with smaller cars in
order to save fuel. By this time it was too late for the American companies. Years of
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developing large, non-fuel efficient vehicles meant they were not ready for such a change.
The foreign companies from Germany and Japan had instead spent the past several decades
developing more efficient and compact machines. As a result, these small vehicles became
the popular trend as people could no longer afford to fuel their big cars and trucks.
Figure 2.2 shows the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) fuel
economy rating for the American Big Three compared with two Japanese brands, Honda
and Toyota. The EPA is responsible for monitoring and rating the fuel efficiency and
emissions of each vehicle on the road. The figure shows the ratings of cars, trucks and
combined between 1975 and 2015. The data uses the average of all of the cars in each
manufacturer’s fleet. In addition, the bottom row of the figure displays the percent of
trucks being produced from a manufacturer’s fleet.
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Figure 2.2: Car and truck fuel economy by manufacturer for model year 1975-2015 and percent trucks being sold.
Graph from the EPA
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In 1990, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler (now known as Fiat-Chrysler) had
average fuel economies of around 20 miles per gallon (MPG) for cars and trucks. This was
when SUVs were becoming very popular in the United States. At the same time, Toyota and
Honda had average fuel economies around 25 MPG. That is 25% higher than the American
level. Between 1990 and 2000 the graphs show little progress by the US manufacturers.
The lower graphs show that there is a huge increase in the percent of trucks being
produced and sold. This parallels the American vehicle taste at the time. This also leads to
a decrease in American brand overall fuel economy. The Big Three were not concerned
with producing fuel efficient or small vehicles. As the Japanese competitors continue to
innovate, their fuel economy continues to rise.
After gas prices began to increase and the size of vehicles began to decrease, the
Americans finally began new developments. However, by this time it was already too late
and they were far behind the foreign companies. The extent of this is still present in recent
years. In their annual report of 2014 model year vehicles, the EPA stated “Fiat-Chrysler
had the highest CO2 emissions and lowest fuel economy, followed by GM [and] Ford” (LightDuty Automotive Technology, ES8). The same was true of 2013 model year vehicle ratings.
The American manufacturers’ lack of innovation and development has then set them back
from foreign companies for over a decade.

Quality of Automobiles
The high fuel economy and large size of American cars was not the sole problem
with Ford, General Motors and Chrysler. The downward trend in American vehicles after
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year 2000 points toward their inferior overall product. Other companies out of Japan and
Germany were not having the same experience as the Americans in selling cars. The
foreign automakers were out-performing using a greater product and technological
development.
Consumer Reports has earned the title as the standard in car reviews with currently
over one million subscribers. Car manufacturers as well as consumers look to the
magazine for automotive advice and references. In 2004, Consumer Reports published
their best and worst used cars of the year.
Every year, Consumer Reports conducts an extensive survey of car owners, asking
them about serious problems that have cropped up in the past 12 months. The
survey generates more than half a million responses, which together paint a detailed
picture of how cars up to eight years old are holding up (Buying Guide 198).
This reports advises consumers as to which vehicles and manufacturers are reliable and
producing the best products. Buyers look to Consumer Reports to make a safe purchase
and to avoid bad products.
In 2004, Consumer reports published their best 39 used cars. Of these 39, only 3
were from US companies. This is a clear indication that the American vehicles reviewed by
the magazine’s survey concluded poor results. This is even more evident while looking at
the worst used cars in 2004. 28 cars made this list that Consumer Reports described as
having “more problems than average over multiple years. Buying one could be asking for
trouble” (2004 CR 201). 24 of the worst 28 were vehicles out of Ford, General Motors or
Chrysler. Due to the poor quality and engineering of their product, Consumer Reports told
their audience not to purchase numerous American cars.
By 2009, the American companies still had not improved. Within their best cars
section, vehicles are separated into the categories: best of the best, family cars, upscale
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cars, luxury cars, sports and sporty cars, minivans, small SUVs, midsized and large SUVs,
and Pickup trucks. Of the total 70 cars, trucks and SUVs that they recommended, only six
were from the American Big Three. In addition, no American car was rated as the best in
its class. Japanese and German manufacturers dominated the remainder of the top 70 cars
and trucks.
To make things worse, the American companies again lead Consumer Reports’
“worst of the worst” category in 2009. The magazine gave 34 vehicles, which it believed to
be the worst performing cars, trucks and SUVs. Consumer Reports does not recommend
any car on this list for customers. They described this class as having “multiple years of
much-worse-than-average reliability among 1999 to 2008 models” (Best and Worst Used).
Of the 34 total, 22 were American cars. It is no surprise that American cars were not selling
as reviews and advice-givers were telling the American people not to buy the products out
of General Motors, Ford and Chrysler. Instead, they were advising consumers to purchase
from the Japanese and Germans.
The quality and poor reviews of Ford, General Motors and Chrysler are due to a lack
of innovation. Figure 2.3 shows a series of graphs that display different auto
manufacturers’ development of variable valve timing. Variable valve timing (VVT) is an
advancement within fuel-injected engines that improves the performance, fuel efficiency
and emissions of the motor. The figure makes it clear that the American companies are
innovating much later than the others. Chrysler, Ford and GM are behind the fleet average
by many years.
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Figure 2.3: Percent of vehicles per brand with variable valve timing. Graph from Center for Automotive Research

Companies like Nissan, Honda and Toyota began advancing and integrating their
variable valve timing technologies in the early 1990s. Chrysler did not begin making cars
with VVT until after 2005. Ford and General Motors also had few cars in their fleet with
variable valve timing until the late 2000s. This is the same story with multi-valves, lockup
transmissions and front wheel drive. All of these developments improve efficiency and
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performance in modern cars. However, the Americans trailed foreign competitors with
each one. This makes it clear that the Big Three were following in other brands’ footsteps
rather than developing their own new technologies.
Besides the in-house development within automotive manufacturers, car companies
use many outside suppliers for parts they do not develop themselves. The supply chain is a
crucial element to any big business, especially an automobile manufacturer. The high
volume of outsourcing parts is due to the huge number of parts going into the final product
that cannot all be produced by a single producer. Increased sourcing is also used in some
cases to reduce costs. Figure 2.4 from the Economic Planning Institute shows the working
relationship between several American and Japanese auto manufacturers and their parts
suppliers. The graph shows that before the recession of 2008 the relationship between
Ford, General Motors and Chrysler and their corresponding suppliers was very poor. In
relation, the Japanese brands shown in the graph maintained adequate to good
relationships with their suppliers throughout the 2000s.
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Figure 2.4: Auto manufacturer to supplier working relations. Graph from the Center for Automotive Research

This relationship is important in the development of automobiles. A company that
has poor relationships with its suppliers is more likely to change suppliers often. This
means that there will be less development and innovation within the parts being
manufactured for specific vehicles. American cars and trucks are therefore less likely to
undergo as much research and development as the foreign companies with good supplier
working relations.

Stock Performance
The innovation, or lack there of, from the American auto companies significantly
affected company performance. The stock prices of the Big Three demonstrate how poorly
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the companies were doing. Figure 2.5 shows the evolution of Ford’s stock price (F)
between 1990 and 20141. The figure tracks the percent growth from the starting point in
1990 in relation to the change in the S&P 500 index through the same period. The S&P
index shows the market pattern of the largest 500 companies with common stock and is
considered one of the best representations of the United States economy. If a company
were to fluctuate according to solely the economy, their stock price would mostly overlap
with this indicator.

Figure 2.5: S&P 500 vs. Ford from 1990-2014

In figure 2.5 above, it is clear that Ford and the S&P 500 are not following the same
path. Rather, there is a great deviation between the price of Ford stock and the S&P index.
Ford is greatly underperforming the S&P and therefore the nation. Between 1990 and
around 2001, the two lines follow close growth patterns. This means that Ford was
following the national economic progression at this time. However, after 2000, the lines
General Motors and Chrysler stock information was not available before 2009 due to
company restructuring and acquisition during government bailout.
1
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grow further and further apart until there is little parallel between them. The biggest
difference is between 2003 and 2007 as Ford undergoes steady decline while the S&P, and
therefore the nation, grow significantly. This is representative of the deterioration the US
automotive industry independent of economic condition.
The national recession is clearly indicated in 2007 and 2008 as the S&P 500 has a
huge sudden drop. However, Ford only declines a fraction of the amount. This signifies
that Ford was not affected by the recession as drastically as the economy as a whole. While
the S&P 500 drops much more significantly, its growth remains far above the single firm.
Ford was in a devastating place at this time, progressing below the 1990 stock price. The
graph shows the decline clearly started in the early 2000s and is not only due to the
economic recession.
The graph also indicates the difference in overall growth during this period. Starting
with a basis of zero, the S&P 500 grows over 400% over fifteen years. Meaning, the S&P
500 price was over four times higher at the end of 2014 than the start of 1990. This is a
long-term upward trend that can be expected of such a time frame. Ford does not show the
same growth and only gains 91%. In addition, at two separate points in the span of time
Ford drops under its 1990 stock price. This is something that is not even close to the S&P
500, even during the recession.
Besides being far behind the S&P 500 and showing very poor performance, figure
2.6 shows Ford’s stock price compared to that of Wal-Mart (WMT) and Honda (HMC)
between 2004 and 2014. This graph keeps the S&P index so it can be compared
additionally to the other companies. Ford’s stock growth remains significantly below the
other three measures for nearly the entire time span.
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Figure 2.6: S&P 500, Ford, Wal-Mart and Honda from 2004-2014

In adding Wal-Mart, figure 2.6 now looks at another American company that
endured the same economic conditions as Ford. Like Ford’s stock, Wal-Mart’s stock price is
below the S&P average between 2005 and 2009. However, it stays much more level and
does not undergo any significant declines over the entire ten-year period. Looking at the
entire graph, the Wal-Mart stock follows very similar levels and fluctuations as the S&P.
This is especially true between 2009 and 2014 as the two lines have a great amount of
overlap. This evidences that the overall economy was not responsible for the downturn of
Ford, as another American company was not undergoing the same trend.
Looking at the purple line in the graph, Honda is now compared to Ford and the S&P
between 2004 and 2014. This line stands clearly above all other three lines for the entirety
of the figure. As Ford is undergoing a steady decline from 2004 to 2008, Honda’s stock
price rises for most of this period. In addition, Honda experiences nearly the same drop
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during 2008 as the S&P 500. This means that the foreign carmaker was affected in a very
similar manner by the financial recession as the American economy. Ford and Honda stock
prices experience very different trends that are signs of differentiated development for
each firm. This illustrates that automakers as a whole were not bearing the same
deterioration that the American car manufacturers had.
The period after the turn of the century marks the downfall for the US auto industry.
During the bailout, American auto CEOs argued the economy was the force that landed the
companies in the financial whole of 2008. However, figures 2.5 and 2.6 clearly show that
American automakers were not following economic trends and were doing more poorly
than other US and automotive companies. Foreign automakers must have then had
another element that lead to their superior performance. This indicates the internal causes
that lead to the crash of the Big Three.

Automotive Market Share
The decline of the American auto industry is further exhibited through the industry
market share. The once powerful Big Three automakers no longer dominate the market as
figure 2.7 demonstrates. The three pie charts illustrate the top 10 companies with the
highest market shares in the automotive industry in years 2000, 2006 and 2014. The
differences that are clearly demonstrated in these models are a testament to the change in
industry and economy over 14 years. This will illuminate the decline the United States auto
companies endured that was examined above.
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Figure 2.7: Automotive global market shares in 2000, 2006 and 2014 using data from the International Organization of
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
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As discussed above, 2000 marked the tipping point for the auto industry. After a
steady period of enlarging vehicles and increasing business, the American companies were
at the top of the industry. As shown in the first pie chart within figure 2.7, General Motors
was the top auto manufacturer in 2000, holding 14.4 percent of the automobile market.
Ford followed GM as the second largest with 12.9 percent market share. The smallest of
the US Big Three, Chrysler, also showed success as the fifth highest market shareholder
with 8.2 percent. The foreign companies out of Japan and Germany do not have nearly the
same influence on the global market at this time.
By 2006, the market had already undergone a big turnaround. The American
companies were no longer dominating the auto industry and foreign competitors were
controlling more and more of the market. As displayed in the center chart of figure 2.7,
while General Motors was still on the top, it had lost over one percent of its market share
since 2000, landing at 13.2 percent. Toyota was now just trailing at 11.8 percent. Ford
had dropped to the third largest automaker and plummeted from 12.9 to 9.6 percent
market share. This was over a three percent decrease in only six years. The jump between
2000 and 2006 also shows the impact that Chrysler was enduring. The smaller firm lost
more than half of its market share dropping from 8.2 to 3.7 percent. The falling numbers
indicated the dire position the US companies were in at this time.
Eight years later, the top market shares show a complete rearrangement. By 2014,
General Motors no longer maintained the top spot but instead fell all the way to the third
highest market shareholder. Between 2006 and 2014 GM lost 2.8 percent of its market
share and was now sitting at 10.6 percent. Toyota now led the industry with 11.5 percent
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of the global market share. Volkswagen, which had only 8.3 percent in 2006, now
controlled 10.9 percent of the market and was the second largest automaker. The chart
shows an influx of new foreign manufacturers controlling the market. Hyundai, a Korean
company, went from 3.7 in 2006 to 8.8 percent by 2014. Ford was now only the fifth
largest supplier of vehicles with continued decline to 6.6 percent market share. By 2014,
Chrysler had been acquired by Fiat and was now under Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA)
holding 5.4 percent of the market.
These three charts show a strong picture of the changing automotive climate. The
trend of big American cars had impacted the companies in the long-term. As the Big Three
lost significant business between 2000 and now, the foreign companies showed an
opposite movement. The same is true of the market share within the United States. Figure
2.8, from the Center for Automotive Research, shows the downward trend that all three
American automotive brands have in the US market. General Motors, Ford and Chrysler
continue to have declining US market share over the duration of the chart. This indicates
that Americans are turning more and more to the foreign automotive manufacturers.
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Figure 2.8: Market Share in the US of the Big Three between 1961-2014. Graph from the Center for Automotive
Research

The Manufacturing Sector
In identifying the importance of any and all of the Big Three automakers, the impact
on gross domestic product and employment in the United States are the largest and most
valuable identifiers. In contrast to smaller industries, fluctuations in automobiles are
visibly reflected in these measurements. The automotive industry is contained in the
manufacturing sector of American business. As well as automobiles, automotive parts are
subsets of American manufacturing. These subdivisions contribute largely to the
manufacturing industry and thus to US GDP and employment.
According to the World Bank, in 2000, the United States’ manufacturing sector
contributed 16 percent of the value added to the national GDP. The Bureau of Economic
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Analysis has since stated that in 2008 the manufacturing industry decreased to 11.3
percent of the United States’ GDP. As seen in figure 2.9 below, manufacturing still
contributed the third largest valued of national GDP after dropping over four percent in
eight years. The National Association of Manufacturers states that the manufacturing
industry contains the “highest multiplier effect of any economic sector” with a 1.37 ratio
according to data from the BEA. That is, that every one-dollar spent of manufacturing adds
one dollar and thirty-seven cents to the US economy (Top 20 Facts about).

Figure 2.9: Percent Contribution to US GDP by industry in 2008: Data from Center for Automotive Research

In 2008, the automotive industry accounted for 19 percent of the manufacturing
sector’s output. That is equivalent to 2.2 percent of the national GDP that year. As seen in
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Figure 2.10, this 2008 number is relatively low for the industry. Around 1999, the auto
industry was creating four percent of the nation’s GDP. This was over 23 percent of the
manufacturing sector’s output. This is a massive contribution in a sector as large as the
manufacturing. While the Big Three have declined significantly these numbers show the
importance of the industry to the economy. However, this is only half of the story as
employment is just as crucial in the US economy as the level of GDP.
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Figure 2.10: Automotive output as percentage of GDP. Data from Center for Automotive Research using data from the
BEA

Automotive Employment
The importance of US automotive manufacturing is clear for the impact on national
GDP. However, besides this, a large reason for the government bailout was to protect
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American jobs. The automobile industry is so vast that a bankruptcy would ripple through
millions of individuals and their incomes. The United States employment rate is a crucial
statistic in measuring the health of an economy. “An economy is reinforced by the size and
job creating capability of its manufacturing base” (Center for Automotive Research 2010).
In addition, the automotive industry maintains one of the highest employee value-added
rates among industry manufacturers. In 2006, each employee working in motor vehicles
added $321,000 of final product into the market according to the Center for Automotive
Research.
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Figure 2.11: Automotive Employment from 1990-2014 by sector, measured in thousands. Data from the BLS

The manufacturing sector of the car industry alone employs a very large number of
Americans who are affected by the Big Three automakers’ performance. Figure 2.11 uses
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data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to illustrate the number of jobs that are affected by
the auto industry. The manufacturing sector, that produces the parts and vehicles on the
road, accounts for hundreds of thousands of jobs. Between 1990 and 2006, the automotive
manufacturing sector employed over one million employees within the United States. This
figure peaked in 2000 with over 1.3 million employees after continued success with big
vehicles and lower gas prices. As the Big Three started declining after 2000, there is a
dramatic descent in manufacturing employment that dropped even more severely after
2006. These are the jobs that are being lost as US car companies were failing to sell as
many cars.
During the recession when bankruptcy was possible, the graph shows major job cuts
as the companies attempted to cut costs. Over one hundred thousand jobs were lost in auto
manufacturing between 2007 and 2008 and again between 2008 and 2009. The year 2009
marked the lowest employment in this sector in recent history. This parallels the
industry’s performance and shows how jobs are affected by the welfare of these large
companies. To think if one, two or possibly all three of the Big Three had failed, US auto
employment numbers would have continued to decline to devastating figures.
Manufacturing is not the only employment sector of the automotive industry. As a
tremendous industry, individuals and jobs are affected far beyond the factories that make
the cars. The dealers that sell vehicles and parts are also affected by Big Three. Looking
again at Figure 2.11, the numbers of dealer jobs are greater than manufacturing positions.
The trend in employment between car dealers and parts dealers is nearly the same yet they
both differ from the manufacturing trend. These sectors did not see significant decline in
employment until 2008, when the bailout began. This industry, too, would be devastated
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by the collapse of even one of the American automakers. These numbers not only show the
extent that the automakers affect the American economy but also represent the condition
of the firms during the time period.
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Figure 2.12: Total automotive employment/Total US employment from the Bureau of Labor Statistics

When summing the American automotive employment figures, the total is a very
significant percentage of the total US employment. Figure 2.12 shows the American auto
employment as a percentage of the total nation employment each year according to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Of all Americans employed, the auto industry accounts for
around three percent of jobs. This is a huge number that represents the impact the
industry has on the nation. Looking at the graph, the percent of US employment declines
beginning in the early 2000s. We saw above how the declining automotive employment
figures were due to declining performance. However, figure 2.12 shows that, during the
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recessionary period, the auto industry is declining more significantly than the entire
economy in terms of employment. If the decline in employment was due to the recession
alone, the graph would show a more flat distribution. This is because the auto employment
would be reducing evenly relative to total employment. Since there is a major decline from
2006 to 2009, the Big Three are performing worse than the overall nation.
While many foreign car manufacturers are now producing vehicles within the
United States, Figure 2.13 displays their employment gap from the Big Three. Ford,
General Motors and Chrysler are employing almost a 68 percent majority of American
automotive jobs. This means that the majority of the auto jobs are held by those affected by
the three American companies. According the American Automotive Policy Council, in
2014 Fiat Chrysler Automobiles employs 16.84 percent of the American Automotive jobs.
If the smallest American auto company had not been bailed out and had failed during the
recession, this portion of workers would have been unemployed. This is a huge number
that would have brought national unemployment numbers down significantly.
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US Auto Employment by Manufacturer in 2014
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Figure 2.13: Employment in the United States from the automotive industry by manufacturer. Data from American
Automotive Policy Council

As it is proven above, the economic climate was clearly not the sole reason behind
the decline of the American auto companies. The statement in the previous section from
Chrysler CEO, Robert Nardelli, stating the company performance was entirely due to the
financial crisis is evidently false. Ford, General Motors and Chrysler were declining at a
different rate that the US economy due to a lack of innovation and progression. The big
business strategies used by the three firms put them behind the foreign companies out of
Japan and Germany. As we will examine in the following chapter, the financialization and
practices of the American auto companies also contributed to their downfall and
subsequent crash.
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3. Financialization of the Automobile
The half-century before the Great Depression was consumed with big business and
the rise of robber barons. American business grew and industrialized through the end of
the nineteenth century becoming known as the “industrial period”. As businesses grew,
each required more and more funding to handle costs and business expenses. It quickly
became impossible to fund these large companies through individual wealth. Therefore,
the necessity to borrow became abundant to support and continue to grow big firms. This
began the financial economic stage in the United States. Financial institutions sold equity
shares directly to the firms influenced by “whirlwinds of optimism and pessimism” (Wray
2011c 4). These financial institutions would then create trusts and inflate them with
gullible public investment. They would then sell off their shares and abandon the fund.
This process created little real production and was based on the speculation of trading
capital. “There were no ‘fundamentals’ to drive the Wall Street boom. Inevitably, it
collapsed and a ‘debt deflation’ began as everyone tried to sell out of their positions in
stocks—causing prices to collapse” (Wray 2011c 4). It took the real spending of World War
II to get out of the Great Depression. The period that followed the Second World War was
the welfare state in which the economy maintained stability. This was continued through
the majority of the twentieth century until new financial practices beginning in the 1980s
brought about a new economic state.
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Financial Fragility
Minsky breaks modern financial lending into three risk categories: hedge,
speculative and Ponzi finance. In order, this refers to the level of fragility from the safest to
the most risky. In hedge finance, an individual or institution holds enough liquid cash to
payoff the entirety of the obligation, including interest, at any time. This means the
borrower is able to “fulfill contractual payment commitments on liabilities” (Minsky 1992b
4). Speculative finance signifies that the incoming cash flows are enough to pay off interest
but not the full value of the commitment. Lastly, a Ponzi posture means the individual or
institution lack the ability to pay either interest or the principle value. In Ponzi finance, the
borrower must borrow further in order to repay the initial commitment, placing
themselves in more debt. “Note that Ponzi financing decreases equity for debt increases
without any increase in assets” (Minsky 1992b 6). If the institution does not borrow more
money to cover the interest payments required, they will default on the obligation.
These different financial strategies determine the fragility of an institution. Each
economy holds a mixture of hedge, speculative and Ponzi postures. If there is a majority of
hedge finance, the institution is likely to be less fragile than one that is saturated with Ponzi
positions. Banks use speculative finance, as they are able to replay interest to investors but
do not hold enough liquid cash to repay the full amount. This system stays relatively stable
as banks could maintain paying interest to their investors as long as they did not withdraw
their initial sum. However, if banks were to use Ponzi finance, the system would be
extremely risky and unstable and inevitably lead to a crash. “A liability structure in which
units are heavily in debt so that speculative and even Ponzi finance are common will be
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towards the fragility end of spectrum” (Minsky 1992b 5). Each financialized institution
balances on some combination of the three postures.
Financial fragility is the weakness behind a capitalist economy. Unlike an industrial
based economy, financialization balances on speculative monetary exchanges. The
problem with this is that financial business uses few real foundations as supports.
According to Minsky, “a collapse of asset values, which forces the price of capital assets
below the cost of production of investment output, could occur in many countries” (Minsky
1992b 2). Minsky sees this as the risks in a financial economy and he believes this collapse
would undoubtedly lead to a global depression.
The early 1990s saw the development of securitization of financial institutions. One
purpose of this was to move assets off balance sheets. Doing so would reduce capital
requirements. “If assets did not need to be counted, leverage ratios could rise
tremendously” (Wray 2011a 5). The institution is also able to choose its risk and return
using securities. This securitization system grew tremendously, as Minsky said, “that
which can be securitized will be securitized” (Minsky 1987). Using securities, businesses
avoid the traditional banking system.
Minsky uses the phrase, “make position by selling out position” (Minsky 1992c), in
order to describe the strategy among financial institutions. This terminology refers to the
position of banks and other institutions that use financial lending and borrowing. Selling
position refers to selling debt in order to have more capital to invest. Banks and firms then
lend this borrowed money to individuals in the form of loans. The institutions will then
profit from the loans’ interest to pay back their debt. This type of business can range from
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stable to fragile based on the above borrowing practices that are used. As we will see
below, capitalist tendencies move lending and borrowing into a riskier state.
Keynes’ financial instability interpretation, or the financial instability hypothesis,
believes that after a duration of economically strong time, a financial institution will
progress toward fragility. The theory believes that as a capitalist institution develops, it
will become progressively financialized. This means it would rely more and more on
borrowed money and therefore moving further from hedge and closer toward Ponzi
finance. This dependency is based on the exchange of present money for future money.
“The present money pays for resources that go into the production of investment output,
whereas the future money is the ‘profits’ which will accrue to the capital asset owning
firms” (Minsky 1992c 2). Firms understand that it will be more profitable to borrow more
money and therefore hold less liquid capital.
During the 1990s and 2000s, banks and financial institutions were undergoing this
transition. It was more profitable to borrow more money in order to loan out further
capital. This meant moving closer and closer toward Ponzi finance. In addition, banks
were borrowing money short term rather than long term. “If the Fed was willing to raise
rates that much, no financial institution could afford to be stuck with long-term fixed-rate
mortgages” (Wray 2011a 5). Short-term borrowing allowed them to have fewer costs
associated with each sum of borrowed money. The problem with this system is it relies on
the loans and interest coming into the bank to pay back the debt. If the institution does not
have these cash flows it cannot repay its debts. As we will see below, this became a major
problem leading up to the financial crisis.
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Minsky understood the capitalist banking cycle and believes it is a natural
progressive change. His theory is that capitalism drives toward financialization and
institutions will therefore try to continuously “make position by selling out position”. As
this occurs further and further, the economic structure will become more fragile. The
riskier financial policies will create wholes that could collapse the system. This means a
collapse and a resurrection are destined within this system. Minsky stated that
government intervention is natural part of the process and should not be viewed as a
“bailout”. He stated:
The need for the government to intervene to refinance savings and loan associations
and commercial banks should be viewed as a normal and therefor expected result of
the characteristics of the economy which make intermittent bouts of chaos,
incoherence or hysteresis occur and where the consequences of allowing free reign
to such “states of nature’ are deemed unacceptable (Minsky 1992b 13).
This means Minsky understood the build up to and the reasons behind financial crises. He
believed it was expected for the financial institutions to become increasingly fragile leading
to a crash.

Money Manager Capitalism
According to Wray, the 2007 financial crisis was the result of several key financial
components. These components changed the dynamic of the financial and business
markets. The first was the rise of professional money managers who seek maximum
returns from the funds they control. This is known as managed money. The problem with
this is each manager has the goal of total return and is competing for clients. This
influences the managers to make riskier investments and to exaggerate their numbers. The
money managers along with shadow banks, or “financial institutions that are not regulated
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as banks” (Wray 2011c 6), would purchase commercial paper or junk bonds from firms,
usually in the form of securities. Along with this, an increase in outsourcing in which
money managers such as hedge funds would hire Wall Street firms to manage money. This
would lead to abusive practices like “shoveling trashy assets like asset backed securities
(ABS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) onto portfolios of clients” (Wray 2011c 7).
These investment banks would also help their clients disguise or hide debt.
This system that began in the 1990s was the beginning of money manager
capitalism. Minsky coined this term, calling it “the modern form of the previous stage of
finance capitalism that self- destructed in the Great Depression of the 1930s” (Wray 2011a
2). He saw this system as a culmination of the issues Wray stated above and added that
there was little regulation or supervision. As the name suggests, this period was saturated
with money managers creating growing risk while competing for clients and returns. This
type of business quickly drew upon riskier financing using speculative and Ponzi positions.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the rise of managed money and the decline of banking. Managed
money includes, but is not limited to, hedge funds, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds,
mutual funds and university endowments.
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Figure 3.1: Graph from Minsky 2011a. Graph from Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts

Automotive Financialization
Since the beginning of the automotive industry, the carmakers have maintained high
operating leverage. According to the Foundations of Financial Management, “operating
leverage reflects the extent to which fixed assets and associated fixed costs are utilized in
the business” (Block, Hirt, and Danielsen 126). The operating leverage of a firm is based on
the company’s total costs and total revenue. As illustrated in figure 3.2, a firm with high
fixed costs and low variable costs will have a more flat costs curve while a company with
low fixed costs and high variable costs will have a steep cost curve. As the cost is flatter,
there is greater area between that and the total revenue curve as displayed below on the
left. This means under the break-even (BE) point a firm endures substantial losses while
above the break even will provide large profits. A firm with lower fixed costs, and
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therefore less operating leverage, will have a higher break-even point but will undergo
more mild losses up to that point.
As automakers, there are many large fixed costs that are associated with the
industry. The costs of multiple plants along with a great amount of machinery are all fixed,
as they do not fluctuate. Ford, General Motors and Chrysler therefore all endured high
operating leverage from their numerous assets. This meant their total costs and total
revenues resembled the left figure below more than the right. For the auto companies, if
they were able to sell vehicles and have revenues above the break-even point, their profits
were high and would continue to grow substantially the higher their revenue. However, if
the manufacturers could not reach this crucial point, they experienced huge losses. During
the 1990s when the Big Three were able to sell big numbers of SUVs, their profits were
large. However, as we examined in previous chapters, SUV sales sunk in the 2000s with
rising oil prices and their profits disappeared. This meant that the high operating leverage
and high fixed costs cost the companies huge amounts of money.
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Figure 3.2: Total Revenue vs. Total Costs displaying operating leverage of 2 separate firms

Leading up to 2007, the American automobile companies also began following the
trend of financialization. The car companies began making more and more loans to
individuals purchasing vehicles. Additionally, there was an increase in leased vehicles from
all three manufacturers. The manufacturers were profiting more from the loans and leases
on vehicles than from the sale of the car or truck. This encouraged financial lending and
discouraged industrialization. Meaning, the car companies had less incentive to create new
technologies and improvements in their vehicles. This explains largely to the auto
companies’ lack of innovation displayed in the previous chapter. Ford, General Motors and
Chrysler were not as concerned with the quality of the vehicles being produced as much as
the financing of the good.
Between 1990 and the auto bailout in 2009, the Big Three showed a similar path of
developments that professor Wray believed lead the economy as a whole to the financial
crisis. Following the characteristics of money manager capitalism, the American
automakers wanted to move assets off their balance sheets in order to reduce capital
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requirements. Money managers controlled each company’s money and acted in the
interest of only achieving high total return. Before money managers, the company would
put capital towards the best long-term interest of the firm. Money managers were not
interested in items such as upgrading equipment and numerical costs. Money managers
encouraged whatever practices lead to the greatest profitability. This created a very shortterm view as the managers wanted to generate the highest profits.
In addition to money managers, the automotive companies themselves became
banking institutions. As Wray described above, the three were acting as shadow banks.
Ford, General Motors and Chrysler were giant companies with huge amounts of capital.
They saw the profitability of loaning money and did not have reason to use a third party for
what they could do themselves. This describes the system of big business the American car
companies were using in manufacturing as they were vertically integrated to produce
many parts themselves. The auto companies transformed their treasury departments into
profit centers. In creating and using their financing arms such as GMAC and Chrysler
Capital the carmakers were able to disguise assets using shadow banking strategies. This
was accompanied by the outsourcing of auto loans to investment banks. The different
banks would compete to purchase the loans from the auto manufacturers creating layering.
This means there are intermediaries who increase the firm’s financial leverage.
The auto companies were increasing their financial leverage through these
developing practices. “Financial leverage is the degree to which a company uses fixedincome securities such as debt and preferred equity” (Financial Leverage and Capital).
According to Investopedia, as a firm uses more debt financing the higher its financial
leverage will be. The DuPont system of analysis states that financial leverage, also known
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as the equity multiplier, is directly related to return on equity, profit margin and asset
turnover. The DuPont return on equity (ROE) equation is as follows:
!"#$%& !" !"#$%& = !"# !"#$%& !"#$%& ∗ !""#$ !"#$%&'# ∗ !"#$%& !"#$%&#%'(
The profit margin of the firms represents operating efficiency while the asset turnover
shows the asset efficiency, or how well assets were used to generate sales. The equation
illustrates that if profit margin, asset turnover and/or equity increase the return on equity
will also increase. However a combination of fluctuations in these three variables will
create a relative change.
Every firm aims to increase its return on equity. The ROE tells investors whether a
company will provide them with strong returns on their capital. “Ideally, investors and
analysts prefer to see higher returns on equity” (Maverick). If companies are handled by
money managers, they are required to have a high return or the money managers will not
do business with them. They can achieve this if their profit margin, asset turnover and/or
equity multiplier are strong. The US auto companies understood this and aimed towards a
high return on equity to satisfy the managers.
Illustrated in the previous chapter, the American car companies were far behind the
innovation of the foreign firms. This meant that they were not able to compete over cost as
the Japanese and Germans optimized efficiency. The American response to this was to
compete over quantity by producing as many vehicles as possible. This strategy did not
work until 1990 when the American firms began producing SUVs. This was a product the
foreign companies did not have, and therefore the Americans did not have this outside
competition. The Big Three repackaged their trucks that they had been manufacturing for
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decades into the SUV, which they could then sell at a high price. This meant that the
American profit margins were much higher on SUVs than their sedans and small cars. The
money managers saw this and encouraged SUV production. This behavior leads to higher
asset turnover, as the car companies were able to sell many more vehicles at a quicker rate.
This production trend increased the American auto profit margins and asset turnovers,
which caused an inflated return on equity.
The third element to affect the American auto companies’ ROE was the equity
multiplier of the firm. This means collecting more debt by borrowing more money. As we
saw above, the Americans already had high operating leverage and needed to pair this with
an increased financial leverage. Not only would increased financial leverage provide the
companies with benefits such as concealing assets and increased profits, but this would
also create a higher return on capital for money managers and investors. This incentivized
the carmakers to accumulate further short-term debt. While the ROE can be a good
measure of investment profitability, this shows that a high return can also be a sign of risky
financing and therefore risky investment.
In evaluating a firm, the debt-to-equity ratio (D/E) is equally as important as the
return on equity. This ratio is an appropriate measure because the manufacturing of
automobiles is a very capital-intensive industry. “An increasing D/E ratio indicates a
company is being increasingly financed by creditors rather than by its own equity”
(Maverick). While holding some debt is healthy for a company, containing too much is a
sign of risky financial practices. This means move further from hedge and closer to Ponzi
finance. “Both investors and potential lenders prefer to see a lower D/E ratio. In general,
an ideal D/E ratio is around 1 when liabilities are roughly equal to equity” (Maverick).
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Debt-to-equity ratios can either take the form of a numerical figure or as a percentage
(!"#$%! ∗ 100%). If a firm’s debt-to-equity ratio is greater than 1 (100%) the firm has
more debt than equity and may be a risky investment.
As the American auto companies continued to borrow more and participate in risky
lending beginning around 1990, their debt-to-equity ratio was representative of their
financial practices. Looking at figure 3.3 below, the debt-to-equity ratios of Ford is well
above that of the foreign firms. Capital-intensive industry such as automobile
manufacturing typically has higher D/E ratios than other industries. The D/E ratio of
Japanese and German automakers is much below that of Ford, showing that the US firm had
a different business model than foreigners. Honda, Toyota and Volkswagen all have debtto-equity ratios around 1, paralleling Maverick’s statement above about a healthy ratio.
However, Ford currently has a D/E ratio three to four time that of these foreign
automakers. Ford also has enormous jumps between 2006-2012 due to the large amount
of capital it borrowed in 2006 and the overall financial crisis over the period.
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Figure 3.3: Debt-to-Equity ratios of American and foreign automakers. Graph powered by YCHARTS

Figure 3.4 illustrates the D/E ratios of the other two US automakers from the mid
1990s to 20152. This graph uses data from General Motors and Chrysler annual reports.
Both companies were restructured after the bailout and Chrysler changed ownership from
Daimler to Fiat. This is represented through the fluctuations and jumps in the data.3 While
the numbers are on average below that of Ford above, both companies are still
substantially higher than the Japanese and Germans. The annual reports presented by GM
and Chrysler are illusive and display characteristics of firms hiding debt and assets as
discussed earlier. General Motors generally reported very low levels of debt while
disguising the majority under GMAC. Similar is true for Chrysler and Chrysler Capital. Both
General Motors and Chrysler are separated from figure 3.3 because of limited information
due to the company restructuring after the 2009 bailout.
3 General Motors 2002 value affected by high pension liabilities and therefore assessed
using varied formula
2
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of these financing arms are shadow banks for the manufacturers. The higher levels of debt
that the Americans have over the foreign brands shows they are financing more based on
borrowed money.

Figure 3.4: Debt-to-Equity Ratios for General Motors and Chrysler from 1995-2015

Figure 3.5 below displays the asset-backed securities issued by auto manufacturers
between 2000-2015. “An asset-backed security (ABS) is a financial security backed by a
loan, lease or receivables against assets other than real estate and mortgage-backed
securities” (Asset-Backed Securities – ABS). These numbers represent the number of loans
and leases being issued by automotive companies. The automakers would then sell these
loans to banks in the form of securities. This is the process of outsourcing as discussed
previously. The steep rise in ABSs between 2000 and 2005 is reflective of the easy credit,
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high housing prices and strong economic climate. This created increased demand for new
vehicles and the carmakers were happy to issue more loans. However, the economy
weakened after this point leaving consumers with depreciated vehicles they could not pay
off. “A serious recession might cause many car owners to default on their car payments to
GMAC, and thus leave the owners of the asset-backed security without the promised cash
flows. This happened quite often in 2007-2009” (Block, Hirt, and Danielsen 242). If
financial institutions were borrowing short-term, which the American auto companies
were doing, they would then lack the cash flows to repay their obligations. This is how the
automakers began dealing in Ponzi finance as they relied on cash flows to repay interest as
well as the value of their obligation. Lacking the income, the system failed to be maintained
and collapsed inward on the Big Three.

Figure 3.5: Automotive ABS issuances from 2000-2015
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After 2005 there is a substantial fall in figure 3.5, indicating a decreasing number of
ABSs. This was due to falling demand along with the inability of the automakers to get the
financing to make loans. The fall is also prevalent in figure 3.6 that shows the change in
issuances. There is a steady decline in the number from 2006 to 2010. After years of firms
issuing fewer and fewer loans, the Fed began the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Facility (TALF) program to help the flow of credit. (Felkerson). This allowed automakers
and other financial institutions to increase the issuance of loans, and therefore assetbacked securities. This is illustrated in both figures as the program succeeded in increasing
the number of asset-backed securities. If this program had not been put in place, it is
certain ABSs would have continued to decline. When the TALF program ends around 2012,
the ABS issuances slow down.

Figure 3.6: Percent change in auto ABS issuances from previous year
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These figures are clear indicators that the American automakers had spread into a
wider industry. The money manager control diverged the US firms further from
manufacturing and closer to the banking sector. Acting to achieve high profits, the Big
Three became consumed with issuing loans and accumulating debt. Their practices grew
more and more risky until there was no way to sustain the debt system. This led to the
crash during the financial crisis. Contrary to popular belief, the financial crisis was not the
cause of the auto bailout but just a factor that contributed to the final descent.
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Conclusion
The American automotive CEOs argued that it the fault of the economy as a whole
that the Big Three had fallen to the brink of failure. It is clear now that this was false and
the companies themselves drove themselves into the ground. The performance of the three
companies in relation to that of the whole economy indicated the automakers were
underperforming because of unique problems. Years of short-term views and big business
strategy limited Ford, General Motors and Chrysler from the big picture of the automotive
industry. However, it was not exclusively the traditional issues of industrialization that
drove the decline but a new stage of capitalist financialization.
Focusing short-term, the US automakers overly compensated their business
techniques with large vehicles and SUVs. They were not able to compete with the efficiency
of Japanese or German firms in producing small cars but saw an opening in the large car
market. The Americans were able to generate much higher profit margins producing SUVs
and did not have strong foreign competition in the 90s. The low oil prices allowed them to
sell mass amounts of these vehicles and the money managers encouraged high asset
turnovers to increase return on equity. On top of this, increased debt caused the firms to
become more risky. This increased the financial leverage of the US automakers and
incentivized them to increase their financial business instead of their manufacturing sector.
Innovation suffered because of this and made the Big Three fall further behind foreign
competition. The US carmakers therefore fell apart because of the backward system of
taking financial priority above manufacturing.
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Financialization proved to be a profitable yet harmful characteristic of the American
auto big business. Though this lead up to what Minsky calls a natural bailout, the
automakers do not appear to be learning from their mistakes. In a Reuters article written
by Bernie Woodall, Ben Klayman and Paul Lienert in August 2014, the three stated that
risky automotive lending has increased since the 2009 bailout. Before the financial crisis,
subprime home loans grew out of control from a lack of regulation and oversight. Now, the
regulatory agencies have a firm hold on home loans, so banks are instead changing their
sights on auto loans. There is much less regulation on unsuspecting auto loans and we are
seeing a rise in subprime loans. “General Motors Co (GM.N) is among several automakers
recording growth in subprime lending, to borrowers with credit scores of less than 620”
(Woodall, Klayman, Lienert). The capitalist system of financing continues, as there are
profits to be made. These subprime auto loans may soon bubble up, leading to the next
economic recession since the burst of the housing bubble in the 2007.
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